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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND
THE WAR ON TERRORISM
DEREK JINKS*
The September 11th terrorist attacks prompted a rethinking of the relationship
between liberty and security. The attacks exemplify a new mode of organizing
sustained violence that poses a fundamental challenge to United States (U.S.) and
international law. Indeed, Anne-Marie Slaughter and William Burke-White
recently described this critical juncture in global politics as an "international
constitutional moment."' In the wake of the attacks, the U.S. confronted this
challenge by initiating several important changes in its law and policy--the
architecture of the "war on terrorism." 2 To be sure, the U.S. response generated
substantial controversy concerning three related issues: (1) the most appropriate
forum for prosecuting individuals responsible for the September 11th attacks;3 (2)
the international legal status of combatants captured in Afghanistan; 4 and, more
*Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. This essay is based on my remarks
at the Sutton Colloquium, InternationalTerrorism, Ethnic Conflicts, and Self-Determination, held at the
University of Denver college of Law on March 23, 2002. Special thanks to Ved Nanda, Michael
Scharf, and Paul Williams for inspiring and organizing a remarkable conference.
1. Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An InternationalConstitutionalMoment, 43
HARV. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002).
2. George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, Sept. 20,
2001, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html (last visited
Oct. 21, 2002)
3. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, We Have the Right Courtsfor Bin-Laden, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
23, 2001, at A39 (arguing that any such trials should be conducted in federal district court); Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Al Qaeda Should Be Tried Before the World, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2001, at A23 (arguing
that the U.N. Security Council should establish another ad hoc tribunal); Paul R. Williams & Michael
P. Scharf, Prosecute Terroristson a World Stage, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2001, at M5 (suggesting that
the statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia be amended to confer
jurisdiction over the September I Ith attacks); Ruth Wedgwood, The Casefor Military Tribunals, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 3,2001, at A18 (supporting military commissions of the sort envisioned in President Bush's
Military Order); Laura Dickinson, Courts Can Avenge Sept. 11: InternationalJustice-Not War-will
Honor our Character while Ensuring our Safety, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 24, 2001, at 66 (supporting
"internationalized" trials in other national jurisdictions). On the legality of military commissions
specifically, see Neal K. Katyal & Laurence Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military
Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002); George P. Fletcher, On Justice and War: Contradictionsin the
ProposedMilitary Tribunals, 25 HARV. J. L & PUB. POL'Y. 635 (2002); George P. Fletcher, War and
the Constitution; Bush's Military Tribunals Haven't Got a Legal Leg to Stand On, THE AMERICAN
PROSPECT, Jan. 1-14, 2002, at 26.; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The ConstitutionalValidity
of Military Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 249 (2002); Abraham D. Sofaer & Paul R. Williams,
DoingJustice During Wartime: Why Military Tribunals Make Sense, 111 POL'Y REv. 3 (2002).
4. The controversy concerns whether detained al Qaeda and Taliban fighters qualify for "prisoner
of war" (POW) status under the Geneva Conventions. See Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, entered intoforce Oct. 21, 1950. See
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generally, (3) the most appropriate role for law in any comprehensive strategy
against international terrorism. It is striking that these debates turn on which law,
if any, applies in the "war on terrorism." The questions structuring these debates
are by now familiar: Does the Constitution protect "enemy aliens"? Do the
Geneva Conventions protect "unlawful combatants"? Although these are critical
questions, the focus on U.S. constitutional law and international humanitarian law
has unfortunately obscured the importance of another potentially relevant body of
law: international human rights law. If applicable, international human rights law
would establish conclusively-irrespective of the applicability of the Geneva
Conventions or U.S. Constitution-that all persons subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States, as a matter of law, are entitled to certain basic rights including: the
right not to be detained arbitrarily; the right to humane conditions and treatment if
detained; and, the right to a fair trial on any criminal charges.
INTERNATIONAL DUE PROCESS STANDARDS

For example, international human rights law informs the legal analysis of the
most controversial aspects of U.S. antiterrorism policy including: trial of suspected
terrorists by military '7commission; 6 indefinite detention of citizens designated as
"enemy combatants;" and, prolonged detention of aliens suspected of terrorist
activity. 8 It is important to note that several international human rights treaties, 9
e.g., Coalition of Clergy et al. v. Bush, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (C. D. Cal. 2002) (denying habeas
petition brought on behalf of Camp X-Ray detainees); John Cerone, Status of Detainees in International
Armed Conflict, and their Protection in the Course of CriminalProceedings, ASIL INSIGHTS (Jan.
2002) available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh8l.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2002); Alfred P.
Rubin, Applying the Geneva Conventions: Military Commissions, Armed Conflict, and al Qaeda, 26
FLETCHER F. WORLD. AFF. J 79 (2002).
5. See generally Sofaer & Williams, supra note 3; Note, Responding to Terrorism: Crime,
Punishment, and War, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1217 (2002); see also Ruth Wedgwood, The Rules of War
Can'tProtectAl Qaeda,N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 31, 2001, at AlIl (suggesting that the law has no role in war
on terror).
6. Military Order of November 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain NonCitizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, (Nov. 16, 2001) [hereinafter Military
Order]. The Department of Defense (DOD) has implemented the Order by issuing the rules of
procedure and evidence for the commissions. See Department of Defense, Military Commission Order
No. 1, Procedures for Trials by Military Commissions of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the
War Against Terrorism, (Mar. 21, 2002) [hereinafter DOD Rules]. The use of military commissions in
U.S. history is well documented. See generally David J. Bederman, Article H Courts, 44 MERCER L.
REV. 825 (1993); WILLIAM E. BURKHIMER, MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND MARTIAL LAW 351-69
(Franklin Hudson Pub. 1914) (1892); GEORGE B. DAVIS, A TREATISE ON THE MILITARY LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 307-13 (John Wiley & Sons, 1915) (1898); William WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND
PRECEDENTS 832-34 (William S. Hein & Co., 1979) (1920).
7. See Amnesty International, Memorandum to the US. Government on the Rights of People in
US. Custody in Afghanistan and GuantanamoBay (April 2002), available at Amnesty International
Online, http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/recent/AMR510532002 (last visited Oct. 21, 2002).
8. See, e.g., David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REv. 953 (May 2002); David Firestone &
Christopher Drew, Al Qaeda Link Seen in Only a Handful of l,200 Detainees,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29,
2001, at Al.
9. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, arts. 9, 14, &
15, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June
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declarations, 10 and resolutions" establish minimum procedural protections for all
individuals deprived of their personal liberty. Under Article 9 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), no one shall be "subjected to
arbitrary arrest or detention"'12 or "deprived of his liberty except on such grounds
and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law."' 3 This
provision also specifies that "[a]nyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the
time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any
charges against him."' 4 Article 9(3) provides that all persons arrested or detained
on a criminal charge "shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer
authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a
reasonable time or to release."'15 As interpreted by the United Nations (U.N.)
Human Rights Committee, 16 the provision requires at a minimum that an
27, 1981, arts. 3, 6, & 7, 21 I.L.M. 58 [hereinafter Banjul Charter]; American Convention on Human
Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, arts. 7, 8 & 9, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR]; European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, arts. 5, 6 & 7, 213
U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5, as amended by Protocol No. 3, E.T.S. 45, Protocol No. 5, E.T.S. 55, and
Protocol No. 8, E.T.S. 118 [hereinafter ECHR]; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc.
A/39/5 1(1984), entered into force June 26, 1987 (art. 7) [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
10. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, arts. 9-11, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., at 72, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
11. See, e.g., Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, Eighth U.N. Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, 27 Aug. to 7 Sept. 1990, U.N. Doe.
A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 at 118 (1990); Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, Eighth U.N. Congress on
the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, 27 Aug. to 7 Sept. 1990, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.144/28/Rev.I at 189 (1990); Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any
Form of Detention or Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173, annex, 43 U.N. GAOR 43d Sess., Supp. No.
49, at 298, U.N. Doe. A/43/49 (1988)[hereinafter Body of Principles]; Basic Principles on the
Independence of the Judiciary, Seventh U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders, Milan, 26 Aug. to 6 Sept. 1985, U.N. Doc. A/ CONF.121/22/Rev.1 at 59 (1985); Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/61 1, annex 1, E.S.C. Res. 663C,
24 U.N. ESCOR Supp. No. 1, at 11, U.N. Doc. E/3048 (1957), amended by E.S.C. Res. 2076, 62 U.N.
ESCOR Supp. No. I at 35, U.N. Doc. E/5988 (1977) (Part II. A. Prisoners Under Sentence and Part II.
C. Prisoners Under Arrest or Awaiting Trial).
12. ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 9(1).
13. Id.
14. ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 9(2).
15. ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 9(3). Note that Article 9(3) of the ICCPR applies only to
individuals arrested or detained on a criminal charge, while the other rights recognized in the Article
apply to all persons deprived of their liberty. People awaiting trial on criminal charges should not, as a
general rule, be held in custody. In accordance with the right to liberty and the presumption of
innocence, persons charged with a criminal offence, in general, should not be detained before trial. See
id.; id., art. 14(3). International standards explicitly recognize that there are, however, circumstances in
which authorities may detain an accused pending trial. See id., art. 9(3); see also Body of Principles,
supra note 11, Principle 39; United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-custodial Measures, 14
Dec. 1990, Res. 45/110 Principle 6; ACHR, supra note 9, art. 7(5). For example, pre-trial detention is
permissible if authorities determine that detention is necessary to prevent flight, interference with
witnesses, or when the accused poses a clear and serious risk to others which cannot be contained by
less restrictive means. See Van Alphen v. the Netherlands, (305/1988), 23 July 1990, Report of the
HRC Vol. 11,(A/45/40), 1990, at 115. Therefore, pre-trial detention must not only be lawful, but must
also be necessary and reasonable in the circumstances.
16. The ICCPR established the United Nations Human Rights Committee to monitor state parties'
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individual must be brought before a judge or other officer within "a few days."'
Finally, The ICCPR provides for the right to habeas corpus, or amparo.15 Under
this provision, anyone deprived of liberty by arrest or detention has the right to
"take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay
on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not

compliance with the treaty. See ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 40. This monitoring function involves three
complementary procedures. First, the ICCPR establishes a periodic reporting process. See id. art.
40(1). Under the reporting process, the Committee receives periodic written reports from state parties
which explain the measures they have taken to protect the rights recognized in the treaties. See id.
Government representatives present the reports to the U.N. Human Rights Committee in public
sessions; Committee members question the representatives about issues raised in the reports; and the
Committee publishes comments and recommendations on how to improve the protection of human
rights in the state in question. Second, the Committee drafts "general comments" typically concerning
the interpretation of the substantive rights and freedoms contained in the treaty each committee
oversees. See United Nations High Commission for Human Rights/United Nations Human Rights
Centre, Treaty Database Homepage at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf (last visited Oct. 21, 2002)
[hereinafter UNHCHR Database] See, e.g., DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE
95 (Oxford University Press, 1991) ("The general comments serve rapidly to develop the jurisprudence
of the HRC under the Covenant."). Third, and most important, the Committee receives written
"communications" or "petitions" from individuals alleging that a State party has violated one or more
rights protected by the ICCPR. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, done Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 [hereinafter Optional Protocol]; Torkel Opsahl,
The Human Rights Committee, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HuMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL

(Philip Alston, ed., Oxford University Press, 1992). This procedure is optional, however, and many
states party to the ICCPR do not recognize the competence of the Committee to receive individual
petitions.
See Human Rights Committee, Optional Protocol available at http://
wwwl .umn.edu/humanrts/hrcommittee/hrc-page.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2000) (stating that 95 of
the 144 parties to the ICCPR have ratified the Optional Protocol). Under the First Optional Protocol to
the ICCPR, the Committee performs a quasi-judicial function when reviewing individual petitions. See
TOM ZWART, THE ADMISSIBILITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS PETITIONS (Martinus Nijhoff Pub. 1994).
Although the Committee's decisions are not legally binding, they are widely viewed as persuasive
authority and several States have implemented the Committee's interpretation of the treaty. See
Laurence R.
Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 344-45 (1997).
17. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Righ to Liberty and
Security of Persons (art. 9), 16t" Sess., CCPR General Comment 8, para. 2 (1982). Note that this
provision does not explicitly recognize a right to counsel for all accused at this stage of the proceedings.
The Human Rights Committee has stated, however, that "all persons arrested must have immediate
access to counsel." See Concluding Observations on State Part Report: Georgia, Human Rights
Committee, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.74, 9 April 1997, at para. 28. See also Body of Principles,
supra note 11, principle 18(1); Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, supra note 11, principle I
(stating that "[a]ll persons are entitled to call upon the assistance of a lawyer of their choice to protect
and establish their rights and to defend them in all stages of criminal proceedings."); id., principle 7
(requiring governments to ensure that all persons arrested or detained have access to a lawyer within 48
hours from arrest or detention); see also id., Principle 5 (providing that all persons arrested, charged or
detained must be promptly informed of their right to legal assistance); id., principle 8 (requiring
authorities to ensure that all arrested, detained or imprisoned persons have adequate opportunities to be
visited by and to communicate with their lawyer without delay, interception or censorship, in full
confidentiality). It also has been widely recognized that prompt and regular access to a lawyer for all
detainees is an important safeguard against torture, ill-treatment, coerced confessions and other abuses.
See, e.g Report of the UN Special Rapporteuron Torture, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/17, 17 December
1991, at para.284.
18. ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 9(4).
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lawful." 19 International human rights law has also established an extensive
inventory of procedural rights for individuals facing criminal charges. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 20 ICCPR,21 African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights, (Banjul Charter)22 Inter-American Convention on
Human Rights (ACHR) 23 and the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) 24 all include detailed fair trial provisions. Specifically, Article 14 of the
ICCPR recognizes the right to "a fair trial and public hearing by a competent,
independent and impartial tribunal established by law."25
This provision
enumerates the minimum procedural requirements of a "fair trial," including the
right to be presumed innocent,26 the right to be tried without undue delay,27 the
right to prepare a defense,28 the right to defend oneself in person or through
counsel, 29 the right to call and examine witnesses, 30 and the right to protection
from retroactive criminal laws.3'
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. LAW

The central claim of this essay is that international human rights law
conditions the exercise of U.S. power in the "war on terrorism. ' 32 In one sense,

19. ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 9(4).
20. See UDHR,supra note 10, art. 10.
21. See ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 14.
22. See Banjul Charter, supra note 9, arts. 7, 26. The African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights has adopted a resolution on the Right to Recourse Procedure and Fair Trial which
elaborates on article 7 (1) of the Banjul Charter and guarantees several additional rights, including:
notification of charges, appearance before a judicial officer, right to release pending trial, presumption
of innocence, adequate preparation of the defense, speedy trial, examination of witnesses and the right
to an interpreter. See Doc. No. ACHPR/COMM/FIN(XI)/Annex VII, 9 March 1992.
23. See ACHR, supra note 9, art. 8.
24. See ECHR, supra note 9, art. 6.
25. ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 14(1).
26. See ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 14(2); ECHR, supra note 9, art. 6(2).
27. See ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 14(3)(c); ECHR, supra note 9, art 6(1).
28. See ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 14(3)(d); ECHR, supra note 9, art. 6(3)(b).
29. See, ICCPR, supra note 9, at art. 14(3)(d); ECHR, supra note 9, at art. 6(3)(d):
In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the
following minimum guarantees, in full equality:... (d) To be tried in his presence, and to
defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be
informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance
assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without
payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it.
30. See, ICCPR, supra note 9, at art. 14(3)(e). See also ECHR, supra note 9, at art. 6(3)(d);
ACHR, supra note 9, at art. 8(2)(f):
In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the
following minimum guarantees, in full equality: (e) To examine, or have examined, the
witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his
behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him.
31. See ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 15(1) ("No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on
account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or
international law, at the time when it was committed").
32. Whether any particular U.S. policy contravenes the substantive provisions of the ICCPR is
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international human rights law clearly applies in that the United States has ratified
several human rights treaties, including the ICCPR, and all treaties lawfully made
under the U.S. Constitution are part of the "supreme law of the land."33 In
addition, agencies of the U.S. government, including the Department of Defense,
are required by Executive Order to comply with the ICCPR.34 Although the U.S.
made clear its understanding that the substantive provisions of the ICCPR are
"non-self executing," the treaty nevertheless establish international legal
obligations binding on the executive and legislative branches of government.35
Moreover, the nature of international human rights law suggests that it applies in
all circumstances. That is, international human rights law defines the minimum
rights protections necessary to prevent the arbitrary exercise of power. This body
of law reflects the collective normative aspirations of the international community;
and, as such, provides an indispensable framework for evaluating specific policy
options in the "war on terrorism."
WARTIME AND OTHER "STATES OF EXCEPTION"
The robust regime of procedural rights embodied in the ICCPR would, if
applicable, call into question several aspects of U.S. antiterrorism policy. Indeed,
the U.N. Human Rights Committee repeatedly declared special military courts and
"national security" detention laws inconsistent with the ICCPR.3 6

The application

beyond the scope of this essay. I will therefore analyze the substantive requirements of the treaty only
insofar as these provisions inform analysis of the conditions under which the ICCPR is applicable. See
ICCPR, supra note 9.
33. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, .§ 2.
34. Executive Order 13,107 directs all members of the executive branch to comply with the
ICCPR. See Exec. Order No. 13,107, 63 Fed. Reg. 68,991 (1998), reprintedin 38 I.L.M. 493 (1999).
[hereinafter Executive Order]. The preamble of the Executive Order names three human rights treaties
in particular: the ICCPR, supra note 9; the Convention Against Torture, supra note 9; , and the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660
U.N.T.S. 195, reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966). However, it also recognizes that the Executive Order
shall apply to "other relevant treaties concerned with protection and promotion of human rights to
which the United States is now or may become a party in the future." Executive Order 13,107, supra, at
68,991.
35. See Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 198-204 (Foundation
Press, 2nd ed. 1996). In addition, the "non-self executing" declarations arguably do not preclude
defendants from invoking treaty rights defensively. See United States v. Duarte-Acero, 132 F. Supp.2d
1036, 1040 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (holding the prohibition against private causes of action does not apply
when raising "ICCPR claims defensively"); See also John Quigley, Human Rights Defenses in US.
Courts, 20 HuM. RTs. Q. 555, 580-82 (1998); David Sloss, The Domesticationof InternationalHuman
Rights: Non-Seif-Executing Declarationsand Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 129, 210-214
(1999).
36. See, e.g., Acosta v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 110/1981 (1983), U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40
(A/39/40) at 169 (1984); Scarrone v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 103/1981 (1982), U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40
(A/39/40) at 154 (1984); Barbato & Barbato v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 84/1981, (1981), U.N. Doc. Supp.
No. 40 (A/38/40) at 124 (1983); Schweizer v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 66/1980 (1980), U.N. Doc. Supp.
No. 40 (A/38/40) at 117 (1983); Conteris v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 139/1983 (1985), U.N. Doc. Supp.
No. 40 (A/40/40) at 196 (1985); Machado v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 83/1981 (1982), U.N. Doc. Supp.
No. 40 (A/39/40) at 148 (1984); Lluberas v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 123/1982 (1983), U.N. Doc. Supp.
No. 40 (A/39/40) at 175 (1984); Nieto v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 92/1981 (1981), U.N. Doc. Supp. No.
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of the ICCPR to U.S. action in the "war on terrorism" is, however, complicated by
the fact that these actions are undertaken in the context of an ongoing, formally
proclaimed national emergency 37 and an international armed conflict. 38 Defining
the scope of application of the ICCPR therefore requires an assessment of the
degree to which international human rights law applies in times of war and other
states of emergency.
International human rights treaties allow the suspension of some rights in
public emergencies (such as times of war). 39 Article 4 of the ICCPR provides that
in situations threatening the life of the nation, a government may issue a formal
declaration suspending certain human rights guarantees provided that: (1) a state of
emergency that threatens the life of the nation exists; 40 (2) the exigencies of the
situation "strictly require" such a suspension; 4 1 (3) the suspension does not conflict
40 (A/38/40) at 201 (1983); Caldas v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 43/1979 (1979), U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40
(A/38/40) at 192 (1983); Magana ex-Philibert v. Zaire, Comm. No. 90/1981 (1981), U.N. Doc. Supp.
No. 40 (A/38/40) at 197 (1983); Altesor v. Uruguay, Comm. No. R.2/10 (1977), U.N. Doc. Supp. No.
40 (A/37/40) at 122 (1982); Pietraroia v. Uruguay, Comm. No. R.10/44 (1979), U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40
(A/36/40) at 153 (1981); Bouton v. Uruguay, Comm. No. R.9/37 (1978), U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40
(A/36/40) at 143 (1981); Touron v. Uruguay, Comm. No. R.7/32 (1978), U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40
(A/36/40) at 120 (1981); Motta v. Uruguay, Comm. No. R.2/1 1 (1977), U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40
(A/35/40) at 132 (1980); Muteba v. Zaire, Comm. No. 124/1982 (1983), U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40
(A/39/40) at 182 (1984); Borda v. Columbia, Comm. No. R. 11/46 (1979), U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40
(A/37140) at 193 (1982).
37. President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President in Photo Opportunity with the National
Security Team, (September 12, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2001/09/20010912-4.html (last visited DATE).
38. Mike Mount, U.S. Mounts New al Qaeda Hunt in Afghanistan, available at CNN.com,
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/central/09/09/afghanistan.sweep/index.htm (last visited on
Oct, 21, 2002).
39. See, e.g., ECHR, supra note 9, at art. 15(1); ICCPR, supra note 9, at art. 4(1); ACHR,
supra note 9, art. 27(1). For useful surveys of this area of law, see ANNA-LENA SvENSSONMCCARTHY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATES OF EXCEPTION (M.
Nijhoff Publishers, 1998); JOAN FITZPATRICK, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRISIS: THE INTERNATIONAL
SYSTEM FOR PROTECTING RIGHTS DURING STATES OF EMERGENCY (University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1994); JAIME ORAA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN STATES OF EMERGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Oxford University Press, 1992).
40. See SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at 195-281; FITZPATRICK, supra note 39;
Fionnuala Ni Aolain, The Emergence of Diversity:Differences in Human Rights Jurisprudence, 19
FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 101, 103 (1995) (arguing that the concept of a "state of emergency refers to
those exceptional circumstances resulting from temporary factors of a political nature, which, to varying
degrees, involve extreme and imminent danger that threaten the organized existence of the state");
Lawless Case (Ireland), 1961 Y.B. Eur. Conv. On H.R. (Eur. Ct. H.R. 438, 472, 474) (holding that the
ECHR's derogation clauses may be invoked only in "an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency
which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organized life of the community of
which the State is composed"). The concept of emergency does include circumstances other than
armed conflict. For example, national disasters and extreme economic crises may constitute "public
emergencies." See R. St. J. MacDonald, Derogationsunder Article 15 of the EuropeanConvention on
Human Rights, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 225, 225 (1997). Furthermore, the emergency must be
temporary, imminent, and of such a character that it threatens the nation as a whole. See SVENSSONMCCARTHY, supra; ORAA, supra note 39, at 11-33.
41. This requirement incorporates the principle of proportionality into derogation regimes. This
principle requires that the restrictive measures must be proportional in duration, severity, and scope.
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with the nation's other international obligations; 42 (4) the emergency measures are
applied in a non-discriminatory fashion; 43 and, (5) the government notifies the
United Nations Secretary-General immediately. 44 Some rights, however, are not
subject to derogation even in times of public emergency.4 5 The ICCPR specifically
identifies several non-derogable obligations including the rights to be free from
arbitrary killing;46 torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment; 47 and slavery. 48 Although the rights to fair trial and personal liberty
are, as a formal matter, derogable provisions,49 the U.N. Human Rights Committee
has made clear that many restrictions of these rights are inappropriate even in
times of emergency. 50 Indeed, the Committee, in its General Comment 29, stated
Implicit in this requirement is that ordinary measures must be inadequate; and the emergency measures
must assist in the management of the crisis. See, e.g., ORAA, supra note 39, at 143; MacDonald, supra
note 40, at 233-35.
42. See SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at 624-639.
43. Id. at 640-682.
44. Id.at 683-718; ICCPR, supra note 9, at art. 4(3); ECHR, supra note 9, at art. 15(3); ACHR,
supra note 9, at art. 27(3). The Human Rights Committee has emphasized the importance of
notification for effective international supervision of derogations in states of emergency. See Report of
the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex VII, at 110, U.N. Doc
A/36/40 (1981).
45. Each convention containing a derogation clause provides an explicit list of non-derogable
provisions. See ICCPR, supra note 9, at art. 4(2) (prohibiting derogation from Articles 6 (right to life),
7 (prohibition on torture), 8 (prohibition of slavery and servitude), 11 (imprisonment for failure to fulfill
contractual obligation), 15 (prohibition on retrospective criminal offence), 16 (protection and guarantee
of legal personality), and 18 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion); ECHR, supra note 9, at art.
15(2) (prohibiting derogation from Articles 2 (right to life), 3 (freedom from torture), 4 (freedom from
slavery), and 7 (retrospective effect of penal legislation)); ACHR, supra note 9, at art. 27 (prohibiting
suspension of Articles 3 (right tojuridical personality), 4 (right to life), 5 (right to humane treatment), 6
(freedom from slavery), 9 (freedom from ex-post facto laws), 12 (freedom of conscience and religion),
17 (right of the family), 18 (right to name), 19 (right of child), 20 (right to nationality), and 23 (right to
participate in government)).
46. See ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 6.
47. See ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 7.
48. See ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 8.
49. Proposed drafts of ICCPR Article 4 submitted by French and U.S. representatives would have
made the prohibition on arbitrary arrest, the right to prompt notice of charges, and the right to fair and
prompt trial non-derogable. Both proposals, however, would have made derogable the right to take
prompt judicial proceedings to challenge the lawfulness of detention. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/324 (1949)
(French draft); U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/325 (1949) (U.S. Draft). The representative of the U.K. argued that
the prohibition against arbitrary arrest and the right to a fair trial might be impossible to respect during
wartime or other grave emergency. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.126, at 4-5 (1949). The U.K. view
prevailed when the list of non-derogable rights was agreed to provisionally in 1950. See Joan Hartman,
Working Paperfor the Committee of Experts on the Article 4 DerogationProvision, 7 HUM. RTS. Q.
89, 115-18 (1985).
50. Although the Human Rights Committee recommended against adopting an Optional Protocol
to the ICCPR re-categorizing Articles 9 and 14 as non-derogable, the Committee noted that states
should not derogate from several of the protections included in these articles. The Committee reasoned
that:
The Committee notes that the purpose of the possible draft optional protocol is to add
article 9, paragraphs 3 and 4, and article 14 to the list of non-derogable provisions in
article 4, paragraph 2, of the Covenant.. .The Committee is satisfied that States parties
generally understand that the right to habeas corpus and amparo should not be limited in
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that:
Safeguards related to derogation.., are based on the principles of legality and the
rule of law inherent in the Covenant as a whole. As certain elements of the right

to a fair trial are explicitly guaranteed under international humanitarian law during
armed conflict, the Committee finds no justification for derogation from these
guarantees during other emergency situations. The Committee is of the opinion
that the principles of legality and the rule of law require that fundamental
Only a
requirements of fair trial must be respected during a state of emergency.
51
court of law may try and convict a person for a criminal offence.
The U.N. Human Rights Committee has also emphasized that procedural
rights, such as fair trial rights, must be respected even in times of emergency in
order to protect other non-derogable rights.52 Finally, the Committee, following
that, at
the lead of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 53 strongly suggested
4
a minimum, the right to habeas corpus (or amparo) is non-derogable.
The United States has not, and arguably could not, invoke Article 4 to
preclude application of the ICCPR in the "war on terrorism." First, the United
States has not filed a derogation notice with the other state parties, through the
situations of emergency. Furthermore, the Committee is of the view that the remedies
provided in article 9, paragraphs 3 and 4, read in conjunction with article 2 are inherent
to the Covenant as a whole. Having this in mind, the Committee believes that there is a
considerable risk that the proposed draft third optional protocol might implicitly invite
States parties to feel free to derogate from the provisions of article 9 of the Covenant
during states of emergency if they do not ratify the proposed optional protocol. Thus,
the protocol might have the undesirable effect of diminishing the protection of detained
persons during states of emergency.
Annual Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. G.A.O.R., 49th Sess., Supp. No, 40, at 120,
U.N. Doc. A/49140, at para. 2 (1994).
51. UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29: States of Emergency (Article 4),
UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add.I 1 (2001) at para. 16, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf
(last visited Oct. 21, 2002).
52. The Committee concluded that:
It is inherent in the protection of [non-derogable] rights... that they must be secured by
procedural guarantees, including, often, judicial guarantees. The provisions of the
Covenant relating to procedural safeguards may never be made subject to measures that
Thus, for example, as
would circumvent the protection of non-derogable rights ....
article 6 [the right to life] is non-derogable in its entirety, any trial leading to the
imposition of the death penalty during a state of emergency must conform to the
provisions of the Covenant, including all the requirements of articles 14 [fair trial] and
15 [prohibition on retroactive penalties].
Id. atpara. 15.
53. See Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2), 25(1) and 7(6) American
Convention on Human Rights), 8 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 33, OEA/ser.L.N/lll.17, doc. 13
(1987); See also Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25 and 8 American
Convention on Human Rights), 9 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 40, OEA/ser.L./VI/l11.9, doc. 13
(1987). The Court unanimously held that "'essential' judicial guarantees which are not subject to
derogation, according to Article 27(2) of the Convention, include habeas corpus (Art. 7(6)), amparo,
and any other effective remedy before judges or competent tribunals (Art. 25(1))." Id.
54. Annual Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. G.A.O.R., 49th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at
120, U.N. Doc. A/49/40, at par. 2 (1994).
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Secretary-General of the United Nations, as required under Article 4(3). Indeed,
the United States has not proclaimed, as matter of domestic law, that emergency
conditions necessitating the suspension of fundamental rights exist. Second,
substantial evidence suggests that several of the "derogation measures" are not
strictly required by the exigencies of the circumstances. Of course, the United
States has offered no evidence that specific derogation measures are strictly
necessary to meet the immediate threat of catastrophic terrorism. Additionally, the
fact that investigation, trial, and conviction of Al Qaeda operatives has been
successfully conducted by utilizing ordinary criminal procedure and without
compromising national security, strongly suggests that many of the most
controversial measures are not necessary to confront the emergency conditions.
Third, the nature of the emergency itself may fail to satisfy the threshold
requirements of Article 4. Although the September 11th attacks almost certainly
constituted an emergency "threatening the life of the nation," the continuing, nonspecific and ill-defined threat of terrorist activity does not satisfy this requirement.
Moreover, because "states of exception" are, by their nature, of limited duration,
the U.S. may not manufacture an ongoing state of emergency by waging a
protracted--perhaps indefmite-"war on terrorism." Finally, the derogation
measures arguably suspend non-derogable rights (and rights necessary to protect
non-derogable rights) by violating the personal liberty and fair trial provisions of
the ICCPR.
CONCLUSION

International human rights law recognizes the bare minimum of standards
necessary to protect the safety and integrity of individuals from abuses of power.
As such, it governs how states treat all people in all circumstances--even in time
of war. Nevertheless, this body of law provides for "improved human rights to be
matched by accommodations in favor of the reasonable needs of the State to
perform its public duties for the common good."56 In furtherance of this objective,
human rights treaties explicitly authorize states to restrict or suspend some rights,
subject to several requirements, for an identified set of important public policy
objectives. These codified "states of exception" strike a balance between universal
human rights norms and national interests by specifying the circumstances in
which states may lawfully abrogate treaty obligations. Most important for the
55. The derogation measures do not, however, necessarily violate the prohibition on
discrimination in Article 4(1). Of course, many of the derogation measures are applied in a
discriminatory fashion. For example, the Military Order providing for trial by military commission
facially discriminates on the basis of citizenship. Military Order, supra note 6 (applying only to
noncitizens). Article 4(1) prohibits discrimination "solely on the ground of race colour, sex, language,
religion, or social origin." ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 4(1). Unlike Articles 2(1) and 26-the substantive
provisions on discrimination-Article 4(t) does not prohibit discrimination on the grounds of "national
origin." Compare ICCPR, supra note 9, arts. 2(1) and 26 with id. art. 4(1). The travauxpr~paraloires
of the treaty makes clear that states acknowledged that discrimination based on "national origin" might
be essential in times of war. See, e.g., SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at 643-646.
56. See Rosalyn Higgins, Derogations Under Human Rights Treaties, 48 BRIT. Y.B.I.L. 281, 281
(1976-77).
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purposes of this essay, "derogation clauses" permit the suspension of certain rights
in times of war or public emergency. This derogation regime does not, however,
preclude application of the ICCPR to the "war on terrorism."

